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Islam, Muslims, and Islamic law have become an intense American pre-occupation since 
September 11, 2001. Since then, much literature has been written in academia1 and public 
culture2 alike, deciphering the ìMuslim and the Islamicî,3 bestsellers sold,4 careers made, and 
expertise claimed, solicited, and generously offered. 
Unsurprisingly, another type of literature coincided with the rise of the literature on Islam 
and the Islamic, namely, the one on national security.5 Sometimes, this literature paralleled 
and intersected with that on the Islamic,6 with both fields claiming the same experts, though 
for the most part, the latter commanded its own independent list of bestsellers,7 experts, and 
careered stars.8 Indeed, if the establishment of centers and degrees in U.S. law schools and 
                                                                                                                               
 1. See generally JOHN WALBRIDGE, GOD AND LOGIC IN ISLAM: THE CALIPHATE OF REASON (2011); 
ISLAM, LAW AND IDENTITY (Adam Gearey & Marinos Diamantides eds., Cavendish Pub. Ltd. 2011); 
ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: SELECTED ESSAYS OF ABDULLAHI AN-NA’IM (Mashood A. Baderin ed., 
Ashgate 2010); JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH (Oxford Univ. Press 4th ed. 2010); 
JOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE FUTURE OF ISLAM (2010); ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA, ISLAM AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT 
ISLAM (2011); THE LAW APPLIED: CONTEXTUALIZING THE ISLAMIC SHARI’A (Peri Bearman et al. eds., 
I.B. Tauris 2008); ABDULLAH AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE 
FUTURE OF SHARI’A (2008). 
 2. See generally ERICK STAKELBECK, THE TERRORIST NEXT DOOR: HOW THE GOVERNMENT IS 
DECEIVING YOU ABOUT THE ISLAMIST THREAT (2011); ANDREW C. MCCARTHY, THE GRAND JIHAD: 
HOW ISLAM AND THE LEFT SABOTAGE AMERICA (2010) (stating that the real threat to the United 
States is not terrorism; the real threat is the sophisticated forces of Islamism, which have 
collaborated with the American Left not only to undermine U.S. national security, but also to shred 
the fabric of American constitutional democracy — freedom and individual liberty); BENAZIR 
BHUTTO, RECONCILIATION: ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE WEST (2008); ROBERT SPENCER, THE 
POLITICALLY INCORRECT GUIDE TO ISLAM (AND THE CRUSADES) (2005); KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A 
SHORT HISTORY (2002). 
 3. Mohammed Ayoob, Deciphering Islam’s Multiple Voices: Intellectual Luxury or Strategic Necessity? 
12 MIDDLE EAST POL’Y 79 (2005). 
 4. See generally AYAAN HIRSI ALI, NOMAD: FROM ISLAM TO AMERICA: A PERSONAL JOURNEY THROUGH 
THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS (2010); REZA ASLAN, HOW TO WIN A COSMIC WAR: GOD, 
GLOBALIZATION, AND THE END OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2009); REZA ASLAN, NO GOD BUT GOD: THE 
ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND FUTURE OF ISLAM (2005); IRSHAD MANJI, THE TROUBLE WITH ISLAM: A 
MUSLIM’S CALL FOR REFORM IN HER FAITH (2005). 
 5. See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR 
ON TERROR (2007); David Luban, The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, 22 PHIL. & 
PUB. POL’Y Q. no. 3, at 9-14 (2002); DAVID LUBAN, The War on Terrorism and the End of Human 
Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY (Mark Tushnet 
ed. 2003); JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2007); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005). 
 6. See generally MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 
 (2008); MARK A. GABRIEL, CULTURE CLASH: ISLAM’S WAR ON THE WEST (2007); MARK A. GABRIEL, 
ISLAM AND TERRORISM: WHAT THE QURAN REALLY TEACHES ABOUT CHRISTIANITY, VIOLENCE AND 
THE GOALS OF ISLAMIC JIHAD (2002); DANIEL PIPES, MINIATURES: VIEWS OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE 
EASTERN POLITICS (2003); DANIEL PIPES, MILITANT ISLAM REACHES AMERICA (2003). 
 7. See SAM C. SARKESIAN, JOHN ALLEN WILLIAMS & STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, US NATIONAL SECURITY: 
POLICYMAKERS, PROCESSES AND POLITICS (2007). 
 8. Roger Hertog Program on Law and National Security, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/hertog-national-security (last visited Apr. 2, 2012); International 
Security Graduate Certificate, STANFORD UNIVERSITY 
http://scpd.stanford.edu/public/category/courseCategoryCertificateProfile.do?method=load&certificat
eId=1226779 (last visited Apr. 2, 2012); HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government offers National Security Fellows Program, 
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universities with the title ìnational securityî are any indication, the latter field can certainly 
claim to have commanded the higher interest, if not the resources.9 For all practical purposes, 
the centers and departments historically specializing in all things Islamic have, since 
September 11, witnessed a loss of status, if not money and resources, ironically in the name of 
ìnational security.î10 The proliferation of the former has coincided with the dwindling of the 
latter. The experts of the old have been replaced by the media starred experts of the new. 
That is not to say that conservatives and Islamophobes dominate the field of national 
security. In law schools, the field of national security seems to be squarely divided between 
liberals and conservatives, if not dominated by the former, given the general make-up of the 
law professoriate. The odd thing, however, is that the field of national security has formally 
configured itself around addressing the puzzling question of balancing liberty with national 
security, while it is covertly understood by all its participant interlocutors that what ìnational 
securityî is a stand-in for, is really the ìthe Muslim terrorist,î or in loose terms, the Islamic 
writ at large. Its formalist posture has made the study of the ìMuslim/Islamicî superfluous. 
With some horror, but also quite a bit of amusement, I watched my own law school faculty, 
one famous for its progressive and liberal views on all things under the sun, meet to vote on a 
proposal to establish an LLM degree in national security.11 Not one colleague balked at the 
fact that not a single course in the list proposed for the degree, compulsory or optional, 
included anything on Islam, Muslims, or the Islamic. 
Arguably, the aversion to the formal association of the ìMuslimî with ìnational securityî is 
a good thing as to do so would simply be racist. Surely, it is much better for the Muslim that 
what is at stake in discussions on national security is the competing valuation of liberty 
versus national security among Americans, the ìMuslimî here appearing as simply a 
historically accidental object of national discussion (albeit unnamed) that could be replaced by 
any random ìotherî in the future, as indeed has been the case in the past. One can treat the 
formal dissociation of the two to be a liberal and progressive victory turning the disapproving 
eye away from the Muslim, or at least constraining it as it tries to locate the target of its 
discipline. 
                                                                                                                               
http://ksgexecprogram.harvard.edu/Features/nsf.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2012); and The National 
Security and Human Rights (NSHR) Program at Harvard University, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/nshr/index.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2012); THE GEORGE 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, National Security & U.S. Foreign Relations Law at GW offers L.L.M 
degree in National Security and U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/FocusAreas/natsec/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 
2012); UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES offers The National Security Education Program 
(NSEP), http://www.international.ucla.edu/funding/article.asp?parentid=17181 (last visited Nov. 14, 
2011). 
 9. See Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, DUKE LAW http://www.law.duke.edu/lens/ (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2011); Center for National Security, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 
http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2011); Center on National Security and 
the Law, GEORGETOWN LAW, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/cnsl/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). 
 10. See International Studies in Higher Education Act of 2003, H.R. 3077 (2003). 
 11. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, Georgetown Law, Center on National Security and the Law, recently 
launched an L.L.M program for national security law in Dec. 2010, 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/graduate/NationalSecurityLawLLMandJDLLM.htm (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2011). 
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To be sure, there is an awareness among liberals in the field of national security law that 
the forever expanding national security state has thrown its behemoth weight squarely on the 
shoulders of Muslims, both in the US and abroad, which, at least domestically, has serious 
civil libertarian consequences.12 Meetings between government representatives of the 
security state, civil libertarian advocates, Muslims, and otherwise, continue apace. 
Grievances by such advocates are continuously made over the unwarranted attention given to 
Muslims in certain circumstances, such as travel, immigration, places of worship, some of 
which have even turned into lawsuits.13 Law review articles about ìdiscriminationî against 
Muslims, either private or official, are increasingly appearing in law journals.14 Nevertheless, 
anti-Muslim racism remains a marginal pre-occupation of national security law, a field whose 
theorists remain insistent that what is really at stake in the discussion is the plight of 
ìliberty/security,î and not that of the Muslim per se. More importantly, the client of the civil 
libertarian advocate has proven to be as ìopaque and un-definable,î as that of the object of 
threat of the national security theorist. Both, as embodied in their Islam or ìIslamicity,î are 
treated as historically accidental. They could be anybody, believing in anything, and coming 
from anywhere. What really matters (or warrants attention) is freedom from discrimination 
and liberty (or national security). That is what is at stake, what needs to be considered and 
theorized, and in short, what needs to be known. 
The closest to developing a semblance of knowledge on Muslims, Islam, and the Islamic, 
the liberals/libertarians of the national security field have come is the assertion that not all 
Muslims are violent. It is a formal assumption because it can be safely claimed of any people, 
not just Muslims. It is an important position to take so Americans can proceed to defend their 
national security in a proper way: ìNot all Muslims are Al-Qaeda and Co., only the latter 
demands their institutional and military attention, all other Muslims should be safe from 
unwarranted US attention on the one end, and retaliatory violence on the other.î 
Understandably, this posture is necessary as a response to those who come down on the 
                                                                                                                               
 12. Numerous law suits have been brought on behalf of Muslims concerning Civil rights violations. For 
example, ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights were retained by Nasser al-Awlaki, the 
father of Obama assassination target (and U.S. citizen) Anwar al-Awlaki, to seek a federal court 
order restraining the Obama administration from killing his son without due process of law. See 
Glenn Greenwald, ACLU, CCR Seek to Have Obama Enjoined from Killing Awlaki Without Due 
Procecss, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Aug. 2010), 
http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/news/aclu,-ccr-seek-have-obama-enjoined-killing-awlaki-without-due-
process. Muslim Advocates Organization brought a case against a meatpacking plant by the U.S. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in which, ìsupervisors and workers had cursed [the 
plaintiffs] for being Muslim; thrown blood, meat and bones at them; and interrupted their prayer 
breaks.î Muslim Civil Rights Violations on the Rise, Durbin Hearing Shows, THE LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.civilrights.org/archives/2011/03/1179-durbin-
hearing.html. For a comprehensive list of human rights violations of Muslims, see Restoring a 
National Consensus: The Need to End Racial Profiling in America, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 
(March 2011), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/racial-
profiling2011/racial_profiling2011.pdf. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See generally Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight 
Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 33 (2009); Sahar Aziz, The Laws on Providing Material 
Support to Terrorist Organizations: The Erosion of Constitutional Rights or a Legitimate Tool for 
Preventing Terrorism? 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 45 (2003); Frank E. Vogel, The Trial of Terrorists Under 
Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (2002). 
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national security side, who at times seem to be suggesting that there is that thing about 
ìIslamî that is hateful and violent, and that all Muslims are therefore suspect.15 This crowd 
may advance a Quranic verse or two in defense of their position, in an attempt to use 
culturalism in lieu of racial stereotypes. Given the unpopularity of the latter, stopping them 
in their tracks on the part of the libertarian side, refusing their opining on all things Muslim 
and Islamic certainly seems the way to go.16 That said, I always find it hard to take seriously 
when a famous civil libertarian/national security advocate interviewed on public radio is 
asked to give substantive views on the war in Afghanistan and has little to say! It hits me 
afresh each time I witness it: ìMy sincere advocate is ignorant (deliberately?) of my war!î. 
A parallel phenomenon with a twist seems to have happened on the Muslim side, the other 
side of the expertise corridor described above. The expert on Islam, the Muslim, and the 
Islamic seems to have as little to say about ìnational security,î as the national security 
advocate has to say about the ìMuslim.î It is certainly true that some experts on Islam and 
Islamic Law, in the context of legal academia since September 11, have responded in their 
writings to the assault on Islam and Muslims, and have produced much literature opining on 
the nature of these categories, most of which attempts to dispel stereotypes about the culture 
and its adherents, and attempts to show its internal diversity, historical complexity, 
indigenous liberal, multicultural, and democratic strands.17 Taking the tack that what is at 
stake in all these discussions is the status of Islam in the American mind, many such experts 
proceeded to defend it against its hateful and racist detractors (and there were many) who 
seem to have found a fertile soil in American public culture, both high and low.18 Most, 
however, especially in the field of Islamic law, proceeded with their intellectual projects 
seemingly unaware of the chain of political events triggered by September 11, including the 
US wars on Iraq and Afghanistan, the covert wars in Yemen and Somalia, and the onslaught 
of the American national state on American Muslims, either trotting the earth looking for the 
ìIslamicî to comment on, like one looking to discover a pearl in a shell, or alternatively 
churning out manuscripts on how to reconstruct Islamic law in this or that field.19 The 
violence wreaking havoc in Muslim lands found only the few to comment on, let alone 
theorize. 
In other words, parallel to the position adopted by national security theorists that what is 
at stake really is ìliberty/securityî and not Muslims themselves, the experts on Islam opine 
that what is at stake in the discussion on national security is the reputation of Islam and not 
Muslims themselves. Each side embraces, indeed hugs tenderly, that which it considers most 
                                                                                                                               
 15. DAVID HOROWITZ, UNHOLY ALLIANCE: RADICAL ISLAM AND THE AMERICAN LEFT (2004). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See generally KHALED A. EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFT: WRESTLING ISLAM FROM THE EXTREMISTS 
(2007); KHALED A. EL FADL, THE SEARCH FOR BEAUTY IN ISLAM: A CONFERENCE OF THE BOOKS 
(2006); Wael B. Hallaq, ìMuslim Rageî and Islamic Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1705 (2003); Wael B. 
Hallaq, The Quest for Origins or Doctrine? Islamic Legal Studies as Colonialist Discourse, 2 UCLA J. 
ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 1, 1-31 (2003). See also ASLAN, supra note 4. 
 18. See HOROWITZ, supra note 15. 
 19. See AN-NA’IM, supra note 1; see also SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAM AND THE PROBLEM OF BLACK 
SUFFERING (2009); RICHARD A. DEBS, ISLAMIC LAW AND CIVIL CODE: THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN 
EGYPT (2010); THE ISLAMIC SCHOOL OF LAW: EVOLUTION, DEVOLUTION, AND PROGRESS (Peri 
Bearman et al. eds., 2005). 
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its own, the former liberty/security, and the latter, Islam. My criticism should not be read as 
an objection to the contrasting, by the experts on both sides of the corridor, between what is 
ìephemeralî like the principle of liberty and the religion of Islam on the one hand, and the 
embodied feeling and hurting Muslims on the other; where the latter is seen by me as more 
ìvaluableî than the former (real Muslims matter more than Islam or liberty), rather that both 
sides, it seems to me, eschew knowledge about Muslims-in-history. What strikes me as absent 
in both fields is Muslims as agents of modern history, actors who trigger history’s march. 
The discussion of modern Muslims-in-history inevitably forces us to shuffle the cards a 
little bit. Once we do, we discover that the defenders of Islam (it is not violent) as well as the 
defenders of Muslims (they are not all violent) preoccupy themselves with endowing the 
Muslim/Islam with the quality of ìliberalismî while neglecting to endow it with that thing 
that is most valuable to it in modern history: national security; neither, of course, do those 
who err on the ìMuslims are violentî and the ìIslam is violentî side. The absence of such 
ìendowmentî is highly significant in my view. Indeed, I think that the most ìcharitableî thing 
that a scholar can endow upon the Islamic in modern history is not so much its inherent 
tolerance, non-violence, and liberalism, as a religion, but rather its agency in history as 
seeking its own national security. Indeed, going back to the topic of this symposium, religion 
and international law, what needs to be done is to locate the ìnationalî in the religious (i.e. 
Islam) and read the actions of its adherents as trying to find the only framework available in 
modern history for agency in the world. While it is nice to be seen as liberal and non-violent 
in these days, what is definitely nicer is to be seen as a ìnationî endowed with national will, a 
position allowed the ex-colony in international law in a devious way. Its independence as a 
state and a member of the UN is certainly formally recognized. But let’s not mistake this 
formal recognition of statehood with the recognition of nationhood. While the ex-colony has 
become an ìindependent stateî after the colonial power departed, its boundaries remain those 
willed by the colonial power, and that is a far cry from nationhood! Nation-statehood is a 
status that was achieved by most Western countries in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.20 As they formed themselves into disparate and differentiated nations, and as they 
acquired the state as the proper political framework for their national aspirations on the one 
hand, but also as the ìregulator and disciplinarianî of that nationhood over time, they 
consequentially endowed themselves with national will. The distance between national will 
and national security is a simple act of deduction. 
By contrast, ex-colonial nation states are either fragments of a nation denied the existence 
of a nation state, like the states of the Arab world, or a formal framework for pre-modern 
social groups unable to collect themselves into a viable nationhood, like Africa. The result is 
the same in both cases; when a nation is fragmented it is unable to find its will, and when it 
cannot be created out of potentially disparate parts, it too cannot project any national will. 
Under such conditions, the ìnationalî security such a state seems to project is always really 
the security of the regime. As the Egyptian intellectual Samer Soliman puts it, there are often 
                                                                                                                               
 20. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); 
THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW, POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION, 45 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Anghie et al., eds., 2003). 
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ìstrong regimes and weak statesî behind the formal framework of independent ex-colonial 
states, which is certainly the case in the Arab world.21 Some, but only the fortunate few, have 
escaped this punishing condition, and they are states that have no trouble projecting their 
national security onto the world, namely, Iran, Turkey, and Brazil! When they do, we hear it 
loud and clear. 
To be certain — only nation states can be endowed with national security, only they can 
project national security onto the world, only they can define it, demand it, and work for it. 
Those living in states with their nation torn apart by numerous formal states, as in the case 
of the states whose citizens have waged the September 11 attacks, cannot. It is not accidental 
that national security after September 11 cannot be endowed upon Muslims who, in the 
debate, are seen simply as potential threats to American national security, and not rightful 
owners of the privilege of security. It was not endowed because it could not be imagined, and 
it could not be imagined because it had never been demanded, and it had not been demanded 
because it could not be projected, and it could not be projected because its proper historical 
agent, the ìstate,î was immobilized by its form and deprived of its nation/statehood! 
However, the absence of the proper political form for the expression of national security 
interests does not negate the fact that the citizens of those states have the need to enjoy 
national security the way Americans do, nor that they too feel its urgent call. Absent the 
proper form to capture such security needs, national security remains a political task for the 
ìnationalî collective that finds itself deprived of it. 
Let us not commit the formalist mistake of assuming that there is plenty of national 
security to go around, and that once the proper political form for national living is endowed 
upon all those who lack it at the moment, we can all enjoy the national security manna. The 
distribution of national security in our contemporary world is as skewed as the distribution of 
wealth. In fact, the former seems to follow the tracks of the latter quite closely. Those who 
have plenty of wealth tend to have plenty of national security.22 When looked at closely, it 
seems to be the case that the connecting link between wealth and national security is the 
nation-statehood, with all three enjoyed by citizens at the same time, and all three 
experienced as God-given entitlements by their citizens. 
National security is a scarce commodity in the age of empire, and we live in the age of 
American empire. Empires define their national security interests by negating those who live 
in their imperial sphere. And if there is a region that definitely lives in the American imperial 
state, it is the Arab region. Its oil is highly coveted as a strategic commodity in so far as 
empire is concerned, it is also the region that ìhostsî the Jewish state that the American 
empire has simply decided is an extension of its own national being; the national security of 
                                                                                                                               
 21. SAMER SOLIMAN, THE AUTUMN OF DICTATORSHIP: FISCAL CRISIS AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN EGYPT 
UNDER MUBARAK (Peter Daniel trans., 2011). 
 22. Obvious exceptions, of course, are the oil producing countries in the Arab gulf that host in their 
territories more US military bases than any other region in the world but are the quintessential 
non-nation states. Far from being nation-states, the political framework of their statehood 
resembles more closely a corporation with their citizens as shareholders in the equity of the 
corporation. Compare NAZIH AYUBI, OVER-STATING THE ARAB STATE: POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 240-253 (1995) (applying the corporatism and consociationalism paradigms to the 
Arabia Gulf states). 
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the one is defined as the national security of the other. Cheap oil and safe Israel is the way 
that the US empire has defined its national security needs, come hell or high water. The US 
and its enfant terrible Israel have proceeded accordingly, and the task of response to their 
encroachment on the national security of the Arabs stuck in the air of the region for decades, 
waiting to be picked up by the proper form. 
The trouble with September 11 is that the national security interests of the Arabs came to 
be picked up by the wrong form: the fundamentalist group Al-Qaeda. Its members are Arabs 
suffering the wounded nationalism of all Arabs, which, for the longest time has been 
experienced as the ìmanifest destinyî of the Arabs. Their response has not only missed its 
target (killing civilians is not the way to attain national security), but was a historic moral 
wrong of grand proportions. 
As Egypt follows Tunisia in transforming itself into a democracy through popular 
revolution, and Arabs everywhere wait to enact that manifest destiny, the proper form to 
carry their national security needs will come to the fore. Till then. . . . 
